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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Slaughter-House Cases1 have a bad reputation for good reason.  
Justice Miller’s narrow reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
was used to prevent the federal government from adequately protecting 
African-Americans after the Civil War.2  Further, his opinion for the 
 
∗ Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.  I would like to thank Patrick 
Tyler and Alice Johnson for their research assistance, my colleague Taunya Banks, and especially 
The University of Akron School of Law, its Constitutional Law Center, Professor Richard Aynes, 
and Akron Law Review. 
 1. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
 2. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 643-44 (1883); United States v. 
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 549 (1875); see also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) 
1
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Court significantly delayed the application of the Bill of Rights to the 
states.3  But no one knows whether the world would be better with a 
different decision, because counterfactuals are never certain.4  The case 
did not involve either racial discrimination or incorporation, and total 
condemnation of the opinion for weakening civil rights misses its 
context and misreads its design. 
This Article sets forth the Slaughter-House Cases’ support for civil 
rights.  Justice Miller used federalism in order to protect Reconstruction 
legislatures where significant numbers of African-Americans 
participated fully for the first time.5  His recital of the history and 
purpose of the Civil War Amendments centered on the Amendments’ 
design to protect African-Americans, and suggested sweeping federal 
power to accomplish that end.6  Gutting the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause compelled the Court to read the Equal Protection Clause broadly, 
and was indirectly responsible for the reapportionment decisions of the 
Warren Court.  The Slaughter-House Court’s structural analysis and its 
view of federal protective power provide a basis for congressional power 
to protect citizens from any interference with their participation in the 
federal political process (voting and discussion of and access to the 
 
(relying on Cruikshank and stating that the Fourteenth Amendment does not authorize Congress to 
create “a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights”). 
 3. Even today, the latest case on the application to the states of the Second Amendment’s 
right to bear arms holds that it does not, albeit the precedent is more than a century old.  See District 
of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2813 n.23 (2008) (noting that “[w]ith respect to 
Cruikshank’s continuing validity on incorporation, a question not presented by this case, we note 
that Cruikshank . . . did not engage in the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required by our 
later cases.  Our later decisions . . . reaffirmed that the Second Amendment applies only to the 
Federal Government.”). 
 4. For example, southern legislatures reconstituted under President Andrew Johnson would 
still have countered the federal government, the north might still have tired of the effort to enforce 
the laws, segregation could still have developed, the state action doctrine might still have frustrated 
congressional action, and Campbell might have succeeded in blocking progressive legislation with 
an emphasis on property freedom that could even have invalidated civil rights laws aimed at private 
individuals. 
 5. See MICHAEL A. ROSS, JUSTICE OF SHATTERED DREAMS: SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER AND 
THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE CIVIL WAR ERA 202 (2003) (“When placed within the context of 
Louisiana politics, Miller’s majority opinion in Slaughter-House seems hardly a racist attempt to 
retreat from Reconstruction.  On the contrary, it was a vote of confidence for a biracial 
Reconstruction government then struggling to overcome the forces of reaction.”); Jonathan Lurie, 
Reflections on Justice Samuel F. Miller and the Slaughter-House Cases: Still a Meaty Subject, 1 
N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 355, 366-69 (2005); see generally Michael A. Ross, Obstructing 
Reconstruction: John Archibald Campbell and the Legal Campaign Against Louisiana’s Republican 
Government, 1868-1873, 49 CIV. WAR HIST. 235, 235-53 (2003) (examining the crucial role played 
by John Campbell, ex-Confederate and counsel to the butchers in Slaughter-House, in his ultimately 
successful legal war to destroy Louisiana’s biracial Reconstruction government). 
 6. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 49-54. 
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federal government).7  Justice Miller’s analysis also supports federal 
power to protect citizens from race-based obstruction to their 
participation in state elections.  The difficulties of proving racial 
motivation do not justify blaming Miller’s opinion for the end of 
Reconstruction and the rise of segregation. 
At the turn of the century, the Supreme Court retreated from the 
federal power to deal with race proclaimed by Slaughter-House and its 
progeny, but United States v. Guest revived the analysis in 1966.8  More 
recently, United States v. Morrison cast doubt on Guest’s statements of 
federal power to reach private action.9  This Article argues the Court 
should resolve that doubt in favor of the constitutionality of laws to 
prevent discriminatory interference with access to state elections or other 
facilities.  As I will discuss further, Article IV’s guarantee of a 
republican form of government reinforces that result and provides an 
alternative path for returning to the vision of the Slaughter-House 
Cases.10  
II.  SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES 
The Fourteenth Amendment11 and the federal government’s 
measures to reconstruct governments in the old Confederacy produced 
state legislatures with significant numbers of African-Americans, as well 
as newcomers from the northern states and southerners who had not 
 
 7. See id. at 79-81. 
 8. 383 U.S. 745, 757-60 (1966) (upholding indictment under federal statute for conspiracy to 
obstruct privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States by private attempts to prevent 
interstate travel). 
 9. 529 U.S. 598, 621-23 (2000) (reviving state action of Harris and Civil Rights Cases in 
rejecting dicta from Guest). 
 10. See infra Part VI.  
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  Section 1 is the focus of the Fourteenth Amendment today, but 
contemporaries expected other sections to have the most significant impact.  They were designed to 
strip the old Confederacy of power and to reconstitute it with governments that were not corrupted 
by the evils of secession and slavery.  Not yet ready to proclaim the right to vote regardless of race 
that would be advanced in the Fifteenth Amendment, Section 2 protected against the effect of racial 
exclusion in the South by providing for a reduction in representatives in states that denied the vote.  
Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment wiped out the old establishment and opened all political 
offices to new and untried individuals.  It disqualified from holding state or federal office any 
person who previously took an oath to support the Constitution and then engaged in rebellion or 
aided it.  Section 4 repudiated the debts of the Confederacy and prohibited payments for the loss or 
emancipation of slaves.  Wealthy planters who had supplied the Confederacy were left with 
handfuls of worthless paper and lost the power that wealth had brought.  See, e.g., DAVID E. KYVIG, 
EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776-1995, at 167-69 
(1996). 
3
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played any leading role in the War.12  Opponents condemned the 
Reconstruction legislatures with epithets both racial and non-racial – for 
example, “carpetbaggers”13 and “scalawags.”14  But these legislatures 
brought civil rights to the states.  For example, Louisiana enacted a 
public accommodations law in February 1869 that prohibited the 
exclusion of persons of color from places of public conveyances and 
accommodation.15  It also enacted further civil rights statutes.16 
Along with its civil rights statutes, the Louisiana legislature also 
adopted a measure to restrict the slaughtering of meat in New Orleans to 
a single location, a slaughterhouse owned by a group of investors known 
as the Crescent City Slaughter-House Company.17  The opposition to the 
monopoly was high: the butchers, of course, opposed limits on their 
practice; the old southern Democrats opposed anything done by the 
Republican legislature; and accusations of bribery and monopoly filled 
the air.18  A series of suits and countersuits, as well as political and 
pragmatic twists and turns, took place before the group of cases known 
as the Slaughter-House Cases reached the Supreme Court.19 
The butchers hired former Supreme Court Justice John Campbell, a 
member of the Dred Scott majority who had resigned from the Court and 
served in the Confederate government.20  Campbell sought to use the 
 
 12. For example, about thirty-seven percent of the House and twenty-five percent of the 
Senate in the Louisiana legislature of 1869-71 were African-American.  RONALD M. LABBÉ & 
JONATHAN LURIE, THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES: REGULATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 72 (2003).  The Lieutenant-Governor, Oscar J. Dunn, was an African-
American.  See, e.g., KWANDO M. KINSHASA, AFRICAN AMERICAN CHRONOLOGY: CHRONOLOGIES 
OF THE AMERICAN MOSAIC 55 (2006). 
 13. “[A] Northerner in the South after the American Civil War usu. seeking private gain under 
the reconstruction governments.”  MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 189 (11th ed. 
2003). 
 14. “[A] white Southerner acting in support of the reconstruction governments after the 
American Civil War often for private gain.”  Id. at 1107. 
 15. 1869 La. Acts 37.  This Act – derisively labeled as the “Social Equality Bill” by its 
opponents – “made it a criminal offense to deny African Americans entry to hotels, steamboats, 
railroad cars, barrooms, and other public places.”  ROSS, supra note 5, at 196. 
 16. See ROSS, supra note 5, at 196-97 (“In the following month [after the ‘Social Equality 
Bill’] the legislature passed a law to enforce the article in the 1868 constitution that required public 
schools in Louisiana to be open to all races.  This further enraged whites, who labeled the enactment 
the ‘School Integration Bill.’”). 
 17. 1869 La. Acts 170. 
 18. See LABBÉ & LURIE, supra note 12, at 72-73, 103-06. 
 19. Id. at 136-66. 
 20. Ross, supra note 5, at 241, 251. 
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new Amendments to foil the laws of the Reconstruction legislature.21  
He claimed the monopoly violated the Thirteenth Amendment ban on 
involuntary servitude and the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on 
state violations of due process, equal protection, and the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States.22  Campbell and his co-
counsel emphasized the generality of the language of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and urged that it apply to all restrictive legislation.23 
Justice Miller’s opinion for the majority began with a 
straightforward public health analysis of the statute: confining the 
operation of slaughterhouses to a single location below the city and 
regulating its operation served the public health.24  The limited 
monopoly served the interests of the city by encouraging private 
enterprise to finance the slaughterhouse and assure enforcement of 
restrictions.25  This was within the police power of the state.26 
Responding to the butchers’ linguistic argument, Miller said that 
the new amendments must be interpreted in light of the purpose of 
ending racial discrimination.27  In that perspective, the Thirteenth 
Amendment did not apply to a monopoly for a slaughterhouse location.28  
The Amendment forbade personal servitude, not limitations on the use 
of property.29 
Justice Miller distinguished the privileges and immunities of 
citizens of a state from those of citizens of the United States.30  The 
fundamental rights of “‘protection by the government, with the right to 
acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain 
 
 21. Id. at 249-50.  For example, Campbell argued that the Louisiana public accommodations 
law denied theater owners their privileges or immunity to run their businesses without intrusion.  Id. 
at 249 (citing THE NEW ORLEANS DAILY PICAYUNE, May 16, 1869). 
 22. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 3-30, Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 
(1872), in 6 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 734, 736-63 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975). 
 23. See id. at 22-30, in 6 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 734, 755-63 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper 
eds., 1975).  Senator Matthew Carpenter represented the Slaughter-House incorporators.  David S. 
Bogen, The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment: Reflections from the Admission of 
Maryland’s First Black Lawyers, 44 MD. L. REV. 939, 1019 (1985).  He also took a broad view of 
the substance of privileges and immunities, but argued that the Clause protected against racial 
discrimination and did not apply to the health concerns that led to the monopoly.  See id. at 1018-20. 
 24. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 64 (1872). 
 25. See id. at 65-66. 
 26. See id. at 60-66. 
 27. See id. at 67-73. 
 28. See id. at 67-69. 
 29. See id. at 69. 
 30. Id. at 73-74. 
5
Bogen: Rebuilding the Slaughter-House
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009
BOGEN_COPYFORPRINTER.DOC 6/30/2009  3:47 PM 
1134 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:1129 
happiness and safety’” were privileges of citizens of a state.31  Thus, 
slaughterhouse ownership and freedom to butcher in other places were 
matters for state concern, not privileges or immunities within the scope 
of the Fourteenth Amendment Clause.32  The Clause itself created no 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, but only 
referred to those derived from the “[f]ederal government, its [n]ational 
character, its [c]onstitution, or its laws.”33 
Justice Miller dismissed arguments based on the Due Process 
Clause as beyond any previously accepted.34  He also rejected the 
butchers’ equal protection claim because it was not comparable to the 
race-based denials that gave rise to the Clause.35 
III.  THE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES’ BARRIER TO CIVIL RIGHTS 
Justice Miller’s opinion contradicted the Framers’ vision of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause36 and contributed to a judicial retreat 
from Reconstruction.37  His historical analysis of the new amendments 
supported Reconstruction, but his concern for federalism led him to view 
 
 31. Id. at 76 (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823)). 
 32. See id. at 74-79. 
 33. Id. at 79. 
 34. See id. at 80-81. 
 35. See id. at 81. 
 36. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment overruled Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 
How.) 393 (1856), by making all persons born in the United States citizens of the United States.  
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 73.  See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  The drafters 
believed that citizens were entitled to the same privileges and immunities that are in Article IV, that 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment made the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 constitutionally unassailable and converted it from a statutory to a constitutional command.  
See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens that provisions of 
Section 1 of the Amendment are all asserted in the organic law already, and Constitutional 
Amendment will prevent repeal of the Civil Rights Act); id. at 2511 (Rep. Eliot implicitly equated 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause with prohibiting state legislation discriminating against class); 
id. at 2539 (Rep. Farnsworth stated that Equal Protection was the only clause in Section 1 not 
already in the Constitution).  No state could abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States, and, thus, no state could deny them on the basis of race.  Id. at 2462 (statement of 
Rep. Garfield that the Amendment was to fix the Civil Rights bill in the Constitution); id. at 2465 
(Rep. Thayer said “it is but incorporating in the Constitution of the United States the principle of the 
civil rights bill which has lately become a law . . . .”); id. at 2467 (opposing the Amendment, Boyer 
said “the first section embodies the principles of the civil rights bill . . . .”); id. at 2498 (statement of 
Rep. Broomall that Congress voted for Section 1 “in another shape, in the civil rights bill . . . .”); id. 
at 2502 and 2513 (statements of Rep. Raymond [Raymond had voted against the Civil Rights Bill as 
beyond congressional power and opposed other sections of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment, 
but supported Section 1, saying now the bill “comes before us in the form of an amendment to the 
Constitution, which proposes to give Congress the power to attain this precise result.”]). 
 37. See Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. 
REV. 1323, 1336-43 (1952). 
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the Privileges and Immunities Clause warily.38  Justice Miller feared the 
expansive nationalizing effect of privileges and immunities if the 
Fourteenth Amendment Clause referred to the fundamental rights that 
Justice Washington identified in Corfield v. Coryell39 as the privileges 
and immunities of citizens in Article IV.40  On the other hand, Miller 
recognized racial civil rights as the core of the Civil War Amendments.41 
The Slaughter-House Cases dissenters identified the privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the United States as fundamental rights, such 
as those articulated by Justice Washington in Corfield v. Coryell.42  The 
dissent focused on the negative rights that restrict the power of 
government to interfere with the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property: 
“Clearly among these must be placed the right to pursue a lawful 
employment in a lawful manner, without other restraint than such as 
equally affects all persons.”43  Miller surely recognized the dangers to 
civil rights in this argument – Campbell had used a very similar analysis 
to argue in Louisiana that the state’s public accommodations law 
violated the Privileges or Immunities Clause.44 
More importantly, Coryell’s fundamental rights included positive 
rights, specifically the right to protection by the government.45  Justice 
Miller understood that the federal government had the responsibility and 
power to secure all the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States.46  If they included the protection of life, liberty, and property, 
then the security and protection of fundamental civil rights would be 
transferred from the states to the federal government.47  The federal 
government could remedy state failures to secure and protect such rights, 
but it could also protect them regardless of state actions.48  If the federal 
government had plenary power to enact such laws, federalism would be 
 
 38. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 49-54. 
 39. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). 
 40. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 75-76. 
 41. Id. at 49-54. 
 42. Id. at 96-98 (Field, J., dissenting, joined by Chase, C.J., Bradley & Swayne, JJ.). 
 43. Id. at 97. 
 44. Ross, supra note 5, at 249 (citing THE NEW ORLEANS DAILY PICAYUNE, May 16, 1869). 
 45. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 97 (identifying “protection by the government; the 
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind . . . .”). 
 46. See id. at 77-78. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 78 (stating “not only are these rights subject to the control of Congress whenever in 
its discretion any of them are supposed to be abridged by State legislation, but that body may also 
pass laws in advance, limiting and restricting the exercise of legislative power by the States, in their 
most ordinary and usual functions, as in its judgment it may think proper on all such subjects.”). 
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at an end.49  Government would change to a national form.50  Insisting 
that the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers did not intend such a result, 
Miller said that privileges and immunities of citizens of the United 
States refer to their rights as federal citizens, that privileges or 
immunities relate to the function of the government, and that the scope 
of federal power had not been significantly altered except by the other 
amendments and other clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment itself.51 
After Slaughter-House, courts throughout the legal system used the 
limited version of privileges or immunities to deny the Amendment’s 
application to state licenses, including bar membership.52  Worse, the 
Court consistently cited Slaughter-House in decisions finding that the 
federal government lacked power to protect citizens against violence 
directed at preventing their voting.53  The decision’s rationale precluded 
the use of the Privileges and Immunities Clause as a source for 
congressional regulation of contract and property rights.  Thus, Congress 
had to use other powers to protect individuals from private acts of 
discrimination, and even today the Court holds that some attempts by 
Congress to protect citizens from violent acts and discrimination are 
beyond its power.54 
Further, pursuant to Miller’s reasoning, the Clause could not be 
used in any argument for fundamental rights not derived from the 
functions of the federal government.  His insistence that the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause did not create any new constitutional rights precluded 
 
 49. See id.  “[I]t radically changes the whole theory of the relations of the State and Federal 
governments to each other and of both these governments to the people . . . .”  Id. 
 50. See id. 
 51. Id. at 82 (“[W]e do not see in those amendments any purpose to destroy the main features 
of the general system.  Under the pressure of all the excited feeling growing out of the war, our 
statesmen have still believed that the existence of the States with powers for domestic and local 
government, including the regulation of civil rights—the rights of person and of property—was 
essential to the perfect working of our complex form of government, though they have thought 
proper to impose additional limitations on the States, and to confer additional power on that of the 
Nation.”). 
 52. See Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1872); In re Taylor, 48 Md. 28, 32-34 
(1877) (citing Bradwell in concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to the 
exclusion of blacks from membership in the bar). 
 53. See James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 138 (1903); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 
638, 643 (1883); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 549 (1875). 
 54. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621-24 (2000) (reviving the state action 
doctrine of Harris and Civil Rights Cases in rejecting dicta from Guest); United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeded Congress’s 
Commerce Clause authority). 
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the use of that Clause to incorporate the individual rights guarantees.55  
Thus, the Court for many years refused to apply the Bill of Rights 
against the states, citing the Slaughter-House Cases as support for that 
position.56 
Nevertheless, in context, Miller’s interpretation of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause protected civil rights legislation of reconstructed 
legislatures through a strong version of federalism.  The misuse of the 
case to impair federal power ignored the opinion’s design to shift 
protection of the civil rights of African-Americans to other clauses. 
IV.  SLAUGHTER-HOUSE DETOURS: NEUTRAL ANALYSIS PERMITTING 
EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION 
Although Justice Miller’s opinion foreclosed use of the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause to enforce the fundamental rights of citizens, it left 
the door open for the use of other clauses to accomplish many of the 
same ends.  With respect to several of these clauses, the Slaughter-
House Cases did not support civil rights, but it offered them no barrier.  
The Court eventually moved into the openings to accomplish through the 
Commerce Clause, the Thirteenth Amendment, and the Due Process 
Clause much of what might have been accomplished by a broad 
interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 
A.  Commerce Clause 
The federal government did not regulate expansively during the 
nineteenth century.  The states’ power to enact laws affecting commerce 
posed the main Commerce Clause issue.  The Court’s analysis of the 
problem distinguished commercial regulation from exercises of the 
police power.57  The Slaughter-House Cases noted that regulation of 
slaughtering was within the police power of the states, citing Gibbons v. 
Ogden for the proposition that health laws were matters subject to state 
 
 55. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 77.  Congressman John Bingham, the chief drafter 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, understood that the Privileges and Immunities Clause secured the 
fundamental rights of citizens, including the individual rights in the Bill of Rights, against state 
abridgement.  CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84-85 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham).  
See generally MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986); Richard L. Aynes, Commentary, Refined Incorporation and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 289 (1999). 
 56. See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 93-97 (1908). 
 57. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 63; Bowman v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 125 
U.S. 465, 489-91 (1888). 
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legislation.58  Justice Miller referred to “the exclusive authority of State 
legislation over this subject,”59 citing several cases to show that health 
regulation was a matter for the states and not for Congress.60  Most of 
the cited cases upheld state laws against dormant Commerce Clause 
challenges and did not focus on the federal power to enact laws 
regulating commerce.61 
The categorical distinction between police and commerce 
regulations reflected in the Slaughter-House Cases was a weak barrier to 
congressional power.  As long as Congress regulates interstate 
commerce, it preempts state law, even exercises of state police power .62  
The key question was how far the federal power to regulate commerce 
extended.  The Slaughter-House Cases did not discuss that, because no 
relevant federal statute applied.  Thus, the decision posed no obstacle to 
the broad interpretation of the commerce power in the twentieth century, 
a power that has become the primary source for the exercise of federal 
power, including the exercise of power to promote civil rights.63 
B.  Thirteenth Amendment 
Campbell argued for the butchers that the slaughterhouse monopoly 
was an involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment 
because it prohibited men and women from using their own property as 
 
 58. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 63 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 
203 (1824)). 
 59. Id. (citing City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837)). 
 60. Id. at 64 (citing United States v. DeWitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41 (1870) and License Tax 
Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462 (1867)). 
 61. The only one of these cases to hold federal legislation unconstitutional involved a federal 
tax statute that made it a misdemeanor to sell certain illuminating oil.  See DeWitt, 76 U.S. at 44.  
The Supreme Court unanimously found the statute could not be supported as a revenue measure, 
and that it was beyond congressional power because it related exclusively to the internal trade of the 
states.  Id. at 44-45.  The government’s argument focused on the tax justification rather than the 
Commerce Clause.  Id. at 44.  There was no mention in the Slaughter-House Cases of the spending 
power, which has become another major source of federal power today.  See South Dakota v. Dole, 
483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987) (upholding condition on the grant of federal highway funds that required 
recipients to prohibit purchase of alcoholic beverages by persons under the age of twenty-one). 
 62. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 26 (1824).  See Gibbons for the distinction 
between commerce and the police power as sources of power. 
 63. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) 
(upholding the public accommodations provisions with regard to hotels, motels, and similar 
establishments under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 
294, 305 (1964) (upholding the public accommodations provisions with regard to restaurants under 
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
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they wished.64  Miller responded that the Thirteenth Amendment 
referred to personal servitude and not to limitations on the use of 
property, and he gave some examples of invountary servitude.65  His 
brief analysis did not touch on congressional power to assure that 
slavery would not exist. 
Justice Miller’s history of the adoption of the Amendments noted 
that the Black Codes were “almost as bad” as slavery,66 and that the 
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted because the Thirteenth Amendment 
had not secured all the Framers supposed they had secured.67  Even if 
each law individually did not create slavery, the total had that effect.  
Miller wrote his brother-in-law, William Ballinger, that the Black Codes 
“do but change the form of slavery.”68  Miller’s comment suggested that 
cumulative acts that imposed personal servitude would be fodder for 
Congress.  Even if statesmen believed “something more was necessary 
in the way of constitutional protection,”69 Section 2 of the Thirteenth 
Amendment might still grant Congress power to enact statutes like the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866.70  Republicans passed the Civil Rights Act and 
the Fourteenth Amendment in the same session, arguing just that 
position.71  Thus, the Supreme Court acted consistently with the 
Slaughter-House opinion when it held in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 
that Congress could prohibit private persons from racially discriminating 
in the sale or lease of property.72 
 
 64. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 22, at 7-8, in 6 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND 
ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 734, 740-41 
(Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) (“I conclude therefore . . . that wherever a law of a 
State, or a law of the United States, makes a discrimination between classes of persons, which 
deprives the one class of their freedom or their property, or which makes a caste of them, to 
subserve the power, pride, avarice, vanity or vengeance of others, that this constitutes a case of 
involuntary servitude under the 13th Amendment to the Constitution.”). 
 65. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 69.  
 66. Id. at 70. 
 67. Id. (stating that the Black Codes forced upon statesmen who had guided the nation 
through the war “who supposed that by the thirteenth article of amendment they had secured the 
result of their labors, the conviction that something more was necessary in the way of constitutional 
protection to the unfortunate race who had suffered so much”). 
 68. ROSS, supra note 5, at 115. 
 69. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 70. 
 70. See United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707, 711-12 (C.C.D. La. 1874) (Bradley, 
Circuit Justice). 
 71. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Intratexualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 823 (1999). 
 72. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437-44 (1968). 
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C.  Due Process 
Campbell and co-counsel Fellows also argued for the butchers that 
the monopoly violated the Due Process Clause, claiming that “it 
deprives them of their property without due process of law.”73  They 
contended that “[t]he right to labor, the right to one’s self physically and 
intellectually, and to the product of one’s own faculties, is past doubt 
property, and property of a sacred kind.”74  And they concluded that the 
grant of privilege was improper and not due process of law.75 
Miller’s response to the due process argument focused on 
Campbell’s contention that the right to labor was a property right.76  He 
pointed to past interpretations of due process and noted that prior courts 
had never found restraints of trade to be deprivations of property subject 
to the prohibition of the Clause.77  Because Campbell had not argued that 
the butchers were denied liberty without due process, Miller’s rejection 
of the property argument did not address whether the restriction was of a 
liberty interest or whether government was substantively limited when it 
attempted to regulate liberty.78  Similarly, the opinion did not comment 
on whether the Due Process Clause could be a vehicle for incorporation 
of the Bill of Rights, since no issue arose for application of individual 
rights provisions of the Constitution against the states. 
Justice Bradley’s dissent in Slaughter-House noted that the Due 
Process Clause swept in almost all of the individual rights mentioned in 
the Constitution.79  Because Justice Miller made no comment on this, 
later courts could pick up the Clause and run with it.  And that is what 
the Court has done, incorporating almost all of the guarantees of the Bill 
of Rights to apply to the states through the Due Process Clause.80  The 
delay may not have harmed civil rights significantly, because most of the 
important rights were recognized in state declarations and constitutional 
provisions, and the Supreme Court did not take an expansive view of 
 
 73. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 56 (providing an abstract of oral argument against the 
monopoly) (emphasis omitted). 
 74. Id. 
 75. See id. 
 76. Id. at 80-81. 
 77. Id. 
 78. If forced to confront the issue at that time, Miller quite likely would have found against 
the butchers. 
 79. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 118 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (stating “. . . above all, 
and including almost all the rest, the right of not being deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law.”). 
 80. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154, 157-58 (1968) (holding that the right to 
jury trial in serious crimes applies to states). 
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those rights prior to incorporating them.  For example, the Court 
incorporated the guarantee of freedom of speech in Gitlow v. New 
York,81 but the abstract right of free speech did not restrain the 
government until the Court began to overturn convictions in 1937.82 
Once the Court accepted the incorporation of freedom of speech 
and other substantive individual rights through the Due Process Clause, 
it could extend the Clause to unenumerated substantive rights.83  The 
noncommittal approach of the Slaughter-House Cases left the due 
process door ajar for the Court to walk through. 
V.  THE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES’ SUPPORT FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 
Justice Miller rooted his opinion in a vision of the Civil War 
Amendments as a series of attempts to accomplish the basic purpose of 
ending racial oppression: 
[T]he one pervading purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation 
of each, and without which none of them would have been even 
suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and 
firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-
made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had 
formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him.84 
He said that purpose must be considered in any interpretation of the 
Amendments: 
[I]n any fair and just construction of any section or phrase of these 
amendments, it is necessary to look to the purpose which we have said 
was the pervading spirit of them all, the evil which they were designed 
to remedy, and the process of continued addition to the Constitution, 
until that purpose was supposed to be accomplished, as far as 
constitutional law can accomplish it.85 
The Court’s rejection of the involuntary servitude and due process 
claims reflected this view,86 but its federalism-focused privileges or 
 
 81. 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).  See also id. at 672-73 (Holmes and Brandeis, JJ., dissenting). 
 82. See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 
263-64 (1937).  The first recognition that Holmes’ and Brandeis’ dissents were a proper statement 
of the law came in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 505-08 (1951). 
 83. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing the right to privacy); 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (recognizing the right to autonomy in intimate choices); 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing the limited right to pregnancy termination). 
 84. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 71. 
 85. Id. at 72. 
 86. See id. at 80-81. 
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immunities discussion87 seemed to conflict.  In order to reconcile 
federalism with racial equality, the Court relied on the Equal Protection 
Clause.88  To reconcile federalism with the need to protect citizens from 
racial intimidation, it stressed implied structural rights and federal 
protective power over affirmative rights.89 
A.  Equal Protection 
The butchers’ counsel attacked the monopoly as an act of 
“legislative partiality” in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.90  
Miller responded that equal protection was concerned with racial 
discrimination, and the monopoly was not a similar oppression: 
We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way 
of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their 
race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision.  It 
is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency, that a strong 
case would be necessary for its application to any other.91 
Taken alone, the Equal Protection Clause offers no guidance for 
application.  All classes are distinguishable by reason of the criteria used 
to define the class.  The only issue is whether that criterion is a 
permissible one, and that is a substantive decision.92  Without context, a 
court could find that nothing violates the Clause or that anything it 
disliked violates the Clause.  Miller’s racial focus provided a guideline 
to determining appropriate criteria without opening the door to ad hoc 
judicial invalidation.  Since Slaughter-House, the Court has expanded 
the Clause beyond race, but the underlying purpose of the Clause and the 
relationship of forbidden categories to the reasons for outlawing racial 
discrimination remain relevant.93 
 
 87. See id. at 72-80. 
 88. See id. at 80-81. 
 89. See id. at 79-80. 
 90. Id. at 56 (providing an abstract of oral argument against the monopoly). 
 91. Id. at 81. 
 92. See, e.g., Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 548-56 
(1982). 
 93. Race is inherent, immutable, politically isolating, stigmatic, and has no inherent 
correlation to legitimate government purposes.  Gender, alienage, and illegitimacy share many of 
these characteristics, and the Court carefully analyzes the situations where the characteristic does 
have a proper relationship to the government purpose. 
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The butchers’ argument assumed that laws regulating the use of 
property were subject to equal protection,94 but that was questionable.  
Operating a slaughter-house could be characterized as a privilege rather 
than a property right.  “Protection” could be limited to securing life, 
liberty, or property “against injury or wrong or outrage or violence.”95  
However, Miller did not envision any such limitation on the application 
of the Equal Protection Clause.  If the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
did not secure racial equality, the Equal Protection Clause must be the 
source for fulfilling the purpose of the Amendment.  Thus, Miller 
characterized the equal protection of the laws in terms that could apply 
to all discriminatory laws. 
Miller’s Slaughter-House opinion undergirded the Supreme Court’s 
civil rights decision in Strauder v. West Virginia that defendants were 
entitled to a jury selected without racial discrimination.96  The Strauder 
dissenters (Justices Field and Clifford) argued that all defendants 
received equal treatment since they faced the same jury, and various 
groups, such as nonresidents, might be excluded from jury 
membership.97  The majority, however, insisted that equal protection 
applied to jury membership and, at a minimum, should preclude racial 
discrimination.98  Quoting Miller’s Slaughter-House opinion, the Court 
said, “The existence of laws in the States where the newly emancipated 
negroes resided, which discriminated with gross injustice and hardship 
against them as a class, was the evil to be remedied, and by it [the 
Fourteenth Amendment] such laws were forbidden.”99  Equal protection 
should not be limited to laws that exclude one race from the protections 
of tort, contract, property, and criminal law, but should reach all laws 
that discriminate racially: 
What is this but declaring that the law in the States shall be the same 
for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or 
 
 94. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 56 (providing an abstract of oral argument against the 
monopoly). 
 95. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2nd Sess. 496 (1872) (statement of Sen. Thurman).  Senator 
Alan Thurman argued that the Equal Protection Clause did not apply to the proposed Civil Rights 
Act.  Id.  There are a number of viable narrow interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause – 
equality in protecting the fundamental rights secured by a broad interpretation of privileges or 
immunities; equality in criminal penalties; equality in protecting individuals from harms caused by 
others, etc.  See Bogen, supra note 23, at 1020 n.272. 
 96. 100 U.S. 303, 312 (1879). 
 97. See id. at 312 (citing Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 349 (1879) (Field, J., dissenting)).  
See also Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 367. 
 98. See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310. 
 99. Id. at 307 (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 81). 
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white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to 
the colored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily 
designed, that no discrimination shall be made against them by law 
because of their color?  The words of the amendment, it is true, are 
prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a positive 
immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored race, – the right to 
exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as 
colored, – exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority 
in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights 
which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards 
reducing them to the condition of a subject race.100 
Justice Holmes cited the Slaughter-House Cases’ statement of the 
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment when he applied the Fourteenth 
Amendment to primary elections in Nixon v. Herndon.101  Slaughter-
House itself had noted that suffrage was essential to fully secure the 
person and property of the freed slave, suggesting that equal protection 
could not be achieved without the vote.102  Holmes’ decision in Herndon 
that racial discrimination in primaries violated equal protection103 led to 
the application of the Fourteenth Amendment in voting rights cases.  
That progression enabled the Court to examine claims of legislative 
malapportionment under equal protection that it had rejected as political 
questions when argued as violations of the guarantee of a republican 
form of government.104  Thus, by focusing on the touchstone for 
interpreting the Clause and intimating a general application, Miller’s 
Slaughter-House opinion supported the growth of equal protection that 
has occurred in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
B.  Privileges or Immunities Implied from the Federal Government’s 
National Character 
Miller’s interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
rendered the Clause ineffective, but not the privileges or immunities 
themselves.  His structural reading encouraged courts to find implied 
 
 100. Id. at 307-08.  The broad vision of the Equal Protection Clause, traceable to the Slaughter-
House Cases and Strauder, was mentioned by the Court when it struck down residential segregation 
ordinances in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 76-77, 82 (1917). 
 101. 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927) (“[I]t seems to us hard to imagine a more direct and obvious 
infringement of the Fourteenth.  That Amendment, while it applies to all, was passed, as we know, 
with a special intent to protect the blacks from discrimination against them.”  (citing Slaughter-
House, 83 U.S. at 36; Strauder, 100 U.S. at 303)). 
 102. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 71. 
 103. Herndon, 273 U.S. at 541. 
 104. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-37 (1962). 
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rights that relate to the function of the federal government.105  Thus, 
Miller’s Slaughter-House Cases opinion reinforced his opinion in 
Crandall v. Nevada, which discovered a right to travel interstate implicit 
in national citizenship.106  The federal government can protect the 
exercise of that privilege against private as well as government 
obstruction.107  Moreover, the right of access to federal offices 
underlying the right to travel supported federal power to protect citizens 
of the United States against private interference with their relationship to 
the federal government, including voting in federal elections,108 access to 
federal facilities,109 and petition and assembly on federal matters.110 
1.  Right to Travel 
The road the Court took encouraged recognition of a right to travel, 
including the freedom from discrimination against new residents.111  
Today, the best known citation of Slaughter-House Cases to support 
civil rights is the use made in Saenz v. Roe: 
[I]t has always been common ground that this Clause protects the third 
component of the right to travel [the right of the newly arrived citizen 
to the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by other citizens of the 
same State].  Writing for the majority in the Slaughter-House Cases, 
 
 105. Miller’s list of privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States included a 
variety of international relationships.  His quotation from Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 
(1867), implied a freedom to engage in foreign commerce.  He pointed to the privilege to request 
protection while abroad, which is also an implicit rather than explicit Constitutional right, and he 
added the rights secured to citizens by treaties with foreign nations as privileges or immunities.  See 
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 79-80.  The implications of his international references have 
only started to be worked through, but they provide fodder for thought.  See David S. Bogen, Mr. 
Justice Miller’s Clause: The Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United States 
Internationally, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 1051 (2008).  In addition to the right to be free from state 
interference with international commerce embodied in the dormant foreign Commerce Clause 
concept and the right to claim protection from the federal government, there is a privilege to be free 
of state interference in international travel, and a limited privilege to rights secured for individuals 
by international common law.  Id. at 1055. 
 106. See Crandall v. State of Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1867). 
 107. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-60 (1966) (upholding an indictment under 
federal statute for conspiracy to obstruct privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States by 
private attempts to prevent interstate travel). 
 108. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 660-67 (1884) (endorsing Fifteenth Amendment 
exemption and strong Article I, Section 4 jurisprudence for federal protection of voters in 
congressional elections). 
 109. See Crandall, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 44. 
 110. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 512-13 (1939); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 
552-53 (1875). 
 111. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500-04 (1999). 
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Justice Miller explained that one of the privileges conferred by this 
Clause “is that a citizen of the United States can, of his own volition, 
become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bona fide residence 
therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State.”112 
Justice Stevens used the Slaughter-House Cases to support a 
decision that found a federal law unconstitutional because it 
distinguished between newly arrived citizens and established citizens in 
the receipt of TANF benefits.113  Stevens also noted the right to travel 
interstate.114  Although Stevens did not cite Slaughter-House for this 
right,115 Miller’s Slaughter-House Cases opinion, quoting from Crandall 
v. Nevada, asserts it: 
[A privilege or immunity of citizenship in the United States is] the 
right of the citizen of this great country, protected by implied 
guarantees of its Constitution, “to come to the seat of government to 
assert any claim he may have upon that government, to transact any 
business he may have with it, to seek its protection, to share its offices, 
to engage in administering its functions.  He has the right of free 
access to its seaports, through which all operations of foreign 
commerce are conducted, to the subtreasuries, land offices, and courts 
of justice in the several States.”116 
The security and protection of national privileges or immunities 
rests with the federal government.117  Thus, the federal government can 
assure its citizens they can travel to its facilities.  In United States v. 
Guest, the Court held that private citizens who acted with the intent of 
interfering with interstate travel could be indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 241 
for conspiracy to injure a citizen in the free exercise of a “‘right or 
privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States 
. . . .’”118  Although Justice Harlan argued that the constitutional right to 
travel was only a right to be free of state interference,119 the majority 
found that the right included freedom from private interference, citing 
 
 112. Id. at 503 (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 80 (1872)). 
 113. Id. at 492-93, 502-03, 509-11. 
 114. Id. at 500-01. 
 115. Id. at 501 (“For the purposes of this case, therefore, we need not identify the source of that 
particular right in the text of the Constitution.”). 
 116. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 79 (quoting Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 
44 (1867)). 
 117. See id. at 75, 77. 
 118. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 747 (1966) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964)).  See 
also id. at 757-59. 
 119. Id. at 762-63 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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Crandall.120  Congress could have enacted a specific statute to punish 
such interference using its power to regulate interstate commerce, but 
Guest shows that the privilege is applicable against private citizens and 
serves as an independent source of congressional power. 
In short, Miller’s Slaughter-House opinion recognized that a right 
to interstate travel and to reside in other states is a privilege or immunity 
of citizens of the United States inferred from the nature of the union, and 
that recognition supports federal legislation to protect travelers from 
private acts of violence aimed at them. 
2.  Federal Political and Civil Rights 
The Court has used the structural analysis exemplified by 
Slaughter-House to find additional privileges or immunities derived 
from the nature of the federal government.  These decisions are rooted in 
an understanding of government by the people: voting in federal 
elections,121 access to the federal government,122 and discussion of 
federal affairs.123  Congress can protect all of these privileges from 
interference, whether the interference comes from government or from 
private individuals. 
Even before the Slaughter-House Cases decision, Judge Hugh 
Lennox Bond of the Fourth Circuit upheld the Enforcement Act of 1870 
in the trial of members of the Ku Klux Klan in South Carolina for 
interference with voting in federal elections.124  He said that Congress 
had power to protect the integrity of federal elections.125  The Supreme 
Court agreed with that position in Ex parte Siebold,126 noting 
congressional power to regulate time, place, and manner of federal 
elections,127 and asserting that this includes power to protect the vote 
 
 120. See id. at 757-58 (citing Crandall, 73 U.S. at 48-49).  See also id. at 759 n.17. 
 121. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 663-64 (1884). 
 122. See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1867). 
 123. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 512-13 (1939) (“Although it has been held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment created no rights in citizens of the United States, but merely secured 
existing rights against state abridgment, it is clear that the right peaceably to assemble and to discuss 
these topics, and to communicate respecting them, whether orally or in writing, is a privilege 
inherent in citizenship of the United States which the Amendment protects.” (citations omitted)). 
 124. See United States v. Crosby, 25 F. Cas. 701, 704-05 (C.C.D.S.C. 1871).  See generally 
Kermit L. Hall, The Courage of His Convictions: Hugh Lennox Bond and the South Carolina Ku 
Klux Klan Trials, in NOBLE PURPOSES: NINE CHAMPIONS OF THE RULE OF LAW 49-63 (Norman 
Gross ed., 2007).  See also United States v. Mitchell, 26 F. Cas. 1283, 1285-86 (C.C.D.S.C. 1871) 
(noting Bond’s charge to the jury in the Ku Klux Klan case). 
 125. See Crosby, 25 F. Cas. at 704. 
 126. 100 U.S. 371 (1879). 
 127. Id. at 383-84 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4). 
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from private injury and from state misfeasance.128  Similarly, writing for 
the Court in Ex parte Yarbrough, Justice Miller upheld the convictions 
of private individuals for injuring a person in the exercise of his right to 
vote in a federal election.129  The defendants argued that states could 
provide the necessary laws, but Miller responded that state action was 
irrelevant to the federal power to protect federal operations, and that 
voting was a critical federal operation: “It is as essential to the successful 
working of this government that the great organisms of its executive and 
legislative branches should be the free choice of the people, as that the 
original form of it should be so.”130  It did not matter that the voter was 
not a federal official, since the voter was acting in the exercise of a 
federal right: 
The power in either case [protecting federal officials or protecting 
voters in federal elections] arises out of the circumstance that the 
function in which the party is engaged or the right which he is about to 
exercise is dependent on the laws of the United States.  In both cases it 
is the duty of that government to see that he may exercise this right 
freely, and to protect him from violence while so doing, or on account 
of so doing.  This duty does not arise solely from the interest of the 
party concerned, but from the necessity of the government itself that its 
service shall be free from the adverse influence of force and fraud 
practiced on its agents, and that the votes by which its members of 
Congress and its President are elected shall be the free votes of the 
electors, and the officers thus chosen the free and uncorrupted choice 
of those who have the right to take part in that choice.131 
Federal law can also protect access to federal offices.132  Miller’s 
opinion in Crandall v. Nevada based the citizen’s right to travel on an 
assumption that citizens had a right of access to federal offices and 
agencies.133  Pursuant to that reasoning, interference with a citizen’s 
 
 128. Id. at 396.  The Court noted: 
Is it possible that Congress could not, in that case, provide for keeping the peace at such 
elections, and for arresting and punishing those guilty of breaking it?  If it could not, its 
power would be but a shadow and a name.  But, if Congress can do this, where is the 
difference in principle in its making provision for securing the preservation of the peace, 
so as to give to every citizen his free right to vote without molestation or injury, when it 
assumes only to supervise the regulations made by the State, and not to supersede them 
entirely? 
Id. 
 129. 110 U.S. 651, 660-67 (1884). 
 130. Id. at 666. 
 131. Id. at 662. 
 132. See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1867). 
 133. Id. 
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access to federal offices and agencies interferes with the exercise of a 
federal right, even if the individual sought access in his or her home 
state.134 
Another structural right implied from the nature of government is 
the right to assemble and petition the federal government for redress of 
grievances.  After listing travel and protection abroad as privileges of 
citizens of the United States in the Slaughter-House Cases, Miller said 
that “[t]he right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of 
grievances, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, are rights of the 
citizen guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.”135  Less than four years 
after Slaughter-House, the Court noted in Cruikshank that the First 
Amendment prohibited “Congress from abridging ‘the right of the 
people to assemble and to petition the government for a redress of 
grievances.’”136  The Court asserted that the right pre-existed the 
Constitution;  it was essentially a natural right for the states to protect.137  
The Amendment only prevented Congress from abridging it.138  Thus, 
the Court, with Miller’s support, repudiated incorporation of the Bill of 
Rights through the Privileges or Immunities Clause.139  But the Court 
added: 
The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of 
petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for any thing else 
connected with the powers or the duties of the national government, is 
an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under the protection 
of, and guaranteed by, the United States.  The very idea of a 
government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its 
citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs 
and to petition for a redress of grievances.140 
 
 134. See In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 535-36 (1895) (recognizing the right to inform officials 
of violations of federal law); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 285 (1892) (recognizing the 
right of prisoners in custody of federal marshal to be protected from “lawless violence”); United 
States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76, 80-81 (1884) (recognizing the right to access federal land grant).  
See also Risa E. Kaufman, Access to the Courts as a Privilege or Immunity of National Citizenship, 
40 CONN. L. REV. 1477, 1491 (2008) (arguing that Crandall reasoning leads to a right of access to 
the courts). 
 135. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872). 
 136. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875) (citation omitted). 
 137. See id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See David S. Bogen, Slaughter-House Five: Views of the Case, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 333 
(2003), for a discussion on Slaughter-House and the incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the 
states. 
 140. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552. 
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The Court went on to say that if it had been alleged that the “object 
of the defendants [had been] to prevent a meeting for such a purpose, 
[then] the case would have been within the [Enforcement Act] statute, 
and within the . . . sovereignty of the United States.”141  Thus, Congress 
may protect people who are petitioning or attempting to transact 
business with the federal government, or even meeting among 
themselves to discuss federal affairs. 
The Cruikshank dicta revealed the dual nature of the Slaughter-
House reference to peaceable assembly.  It became central to the holding 
of the twentieth century Supreme Court decision in Hague v. C.I.O.142  
Labor organizers sued to stop city officials from interfering with their 
actions to promote the labor law.143  Citing the Slaughter-House Cases, 
the Supreme Court said that “the right peaceably to assemble and to 
discuss these topics, and to communicate respecting them, whether 
orally or in writing, is a privilege inherent in citizenship of the United 
States which the [Fourteenth] Amendment protects.”144  Because there 
have been few cases of federal legislation protecting speakers from 
private interference, later cases have focused on the limits on 
government contained in the Free Speech Clause and its incorporation 
through due process.145  However, the implied structural privilege to 
discuss federal laws goes beyond the express Clause and enables 
Congress to protect citizens engaged in that activity from private 
interference. 
3.  State Political and Civil Rights 
Critics of Slaughter-House often focus on its use in subsequent 
cases that struck down indictments and convictions for horrendous 
assaults, including killing African-Americans who dared to act 
politically.146  The murderers escaped punishment for unspeakably 
 
 141. Id. at 552-53. 
 142. 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
 143. Id. at 500-01. 
 144. Id. at 512-13 (citations omitted).  “Citizenship of the United States would be little better 
than a name if it did not carry with it the right to discuss national legislation and the benefits, 
advantages, and opportunities to accrue to citizens therefrom.  All of the respondents’ proscribed 
activities had this single end and aim.”  Id. at 513.  Justice Stone concurred, preferring to rely on 
incorporation through the Due Process Clause, which would apply to all persons.  Id. at 524-27. 
 145. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
 146. See, e.g., CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE COLFAX MASSACRE, THE 
SUPREME COURT, AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION (2008). 
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outrageous acts because the Court either construed the statute147 or the 
indictment148 to broadly apply to any voter interference without regard to 
racial motivation.  The Court held that rights such as voting in state 
elections are not privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States, but only privileges of state citizenship.149  The Court reasoned 
that, unlike voting in national elections, the state elective office was not 
constitutionally based, and the only federal privilege was to be free of 
racial discrimination.150  Thus, violent but non-racially based assaults on 
state voters were like assaults on anyone else.151  The Court feared the 
danger to federalism if the federal government could punish these acts.  
Their decisions overlooked paths that would have upheld federalism and 
the indictments; but, even as it released the perpetrators, the Court traced 
out a theory of federal power to punish the acts that took place.152 
The search for federal power to reach perpetrators of violence on 
African-Americans begins with Miller’s analysis of the purpose of the 
Civil War Amendments.  Miller’s reference to clauses of the Civil War 
Amendments as new privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States153 signaled an expansion of congressional power to protect 
citizens from private interference with the exercise of those rights.  
Miller said they called for protecting the new citizen “from the 
oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion 
over him.”154  But the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments created 
rights primarily against the state.155  Where the right is only against the 
 
 147. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 216-22 (1875) (invalidating convictions by 
interpreting sections three and four of the statute to apply to nonracial obstruction and holding that 
would not be warranted by the Fifteenth Amendment).  Justice Hunt dissented on the grounds that 
the Court incorrectly construed the statute, which he interpreted to apply only to racially motivated 
interference with suffrage.  Id. at 242-45.  The Court subsequently questioned the propriety of the 
majority’s statutory interpretation.  See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 24 (1960). 
 148. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555-57 (1875) (holding the indictment 
invalid because it did not allege a racial motivation for the interference with the vote). 
 149. See Reese, 92 U.S. at 217-18 (holding that the only federal privilege with respect to voting 
in state elections was to be free of racial discrimination).  See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 556. 
 150. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 556-57. 
 151. See id. at 556. 
 152. The Court could have construed the statute and the indictments to apply only to racially 
based actions in these cases.  Alternatively, they might have pursued the Guarantee Clause theory 
proffered in discussion infra Part VI.  See Pamela Brandwein, Rethinking United States v. 
Cruikshank: Law and Politics in a Transitional Period (Nov. 14, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, 
presented at the 2008 Annual Meeting of the American Society for Legal History) (discussing 
Supreme Court’s design to empower Congress to deal with racial violence). 
 153. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71, 74-80 (1872). 
 154. Id. at 71. 
 155. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
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state, only the state can violate the Amendment.  Yet, unless the federal 
government could deal with private acts of terrorism and the destruction 
of the African-Americans’ civil and political rights by violence, new 
citizens would not be protected from the oppressions of their former 
masters.  However, Miller believed that Congress could prohibit racially 
motivated political violence.156  Of course, Congress has power to 
prohibit interference with constitutional rights, since Congress has 
power to enforce those rights.  The problem was how private behavior 
could constitute interference with a right that existed solely against the 
state.  Miller’s subsequent decisions show how Congress was authorized 
by those Amendments to protect citizens from private as well as 
governmental interference. 
Circuit Court Judge Bond’s opinion in Crosby offered one 
explanation to sustain the application of the Enforcement Act against 
private citizens.  He argued that Congress was the sole judge of the 
appropriateness of legislation to enforce the Amendment and that it 
could find that the best way to protect against state discrimination was to 
punish all persons who acted to prevent the vote on a racial basis.157 
Justice Bradley’s opinion on circuit in Cruikshank gave another 
explanation.  He distinguished between the fundamental rights that exist 
independently of the Constitution and those created by the Constitution 
and federal law.158  With respect to natural rights, Bradley said the 
Constitution does not create the rights but only limits government 
interference with them, and congressional power must be directed to 
government action.159  The right to vote, he contended, was different in 
nature, because it conferred a positive right that did not exist before.160  
 
 156. See Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 666-67 (1884). 
 157. United States v. Crosby, 25 F. Cas. 701, 704 (C.C.D.S.C. 1871) (“[T]he constitution has 
declared that the states shall make no distinction on the grounds stated in this first section.  And, by 
this legislation, congress has endeavored, in a way which congress thought appropriate, to enforce it 
. . . . Congress may have found it difficult to devise a method by which to punish a state which, by 
law, made such distinction, and may have thought that legislation most likely to secure the end in 
view which punished the individual citizen who acted by virtue of a state law or upon his individual 
responsibility.  If the act be within the scope of the amendment, and in the line of its purpose, 
congress is the sole judge of its appropriateness.”). 
 158. See United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707, 712, 714 (C.C.D. La. 1874). 
 159. See id. at 714. 
 160. Id. at 712 (“Although negative in form, and therefore, at first view, apparently to be 
governed by the rule that congress has no duty to perform until the state has violated its provisions, 
nevertheless in substance, it confers a positive right which did not exist before.  The language is 
peculiar.  It is composed of two negatives.  The right shall not be denied.  That is, the right shall be 
enjoyed; the right, namely, to be exempt from the disability of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude, as respects the right to vote.”). 
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On this basis, Bradley argued that a right created by the Constitution 
may be protected by the federal government: 
Considering, as before intimated, that the amendment, notwithstanding 
its negative form, substantially guaranties the equal right to vote to 
citizens of every race and color, I am inclined to the opinion that 
congress has the power to secure that right not only as against the 
unfriendly operation of state laws, but against outrage, violence, and 
combinations on the part of individuals, irrespective of the state laws.  
Such was the opinion of congress itself in passing the law at a time 
when many of its members were the same who had consulted upon the 
original form of the amendment in proposing it to the states.  And as 
such a construction of the amendment is admissible, and the question 
is one at least of grave doubt, it would be assuming a great deal for this 
court to decide the law, to the extent indicated, unconstitutional.161 
Both Bradley and Bond saw the protection of voting without racial 
discrimination as the aim of the Fifteenth Amendment, and found 
Congress has power to achieve that end by prohibiting private race-
based conspiracies to prevent persons from voting in state elections.  
Both explanations had difficulty with the Amendment’s references to 
state action, but the Court soon indicated its agreement with their 
views.162  The Court said in Reese that the Fifteenth Amendment gave 
citizens a new constitutional right to be exempt from racial 
discrimination.163  It said in Cruikshank that the Fifteenth Amendment 
provides the right to vote where state law discriminates, and that 
Congress can therefore protect that right.164  Both opinions spoke of 
 
 161. Id. at 713. 
 162. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555-56 (1875); United States v. Reese, 92 
U.S. 214, 218 (1875). 
 163. Reese, 92 U.S. at 218. (“Previous to this amendment, there was no constitutional guaranty 
against this discrimination: now there is.  It follows that the amendment has invested the citizens of 
the United States with a new constitutional right which is within the protecting power of Congress.  
That right is exemption from discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise on account of 
race, color, or previous condition of servitude.  This, under the express provisions of the second 
section of the amendment, Congress may enforce by ‘appropriate legislation.’”). 
 164. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 555-56 (citing Reese, 92 U.S. 214).  The Court said: 
[T]he fifteenth amendment has invested the citizens of the United States with a new 
constitutional right, which is, exemption from discrimination in the exercise of the 
elective franchise on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.  From 
this it appears that the right of suffrage is not a necessary attribute of national 
citizenship; but that exemption from discrimination in the exercise of that right on 
account of race, &c., is.  The right to vote in the States comes from the States; but the 
right of exemption from the prohibited discrimination comes from the United States.  
The first has not been granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States; but the 
last has been. 
25
Bogen: Rebuilding the Slaughter-House
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009
BOGEN_COPYFORPRINTER.DOC 6/30/2009  3:47 PM 
1154 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:1129 
exemption from discrimination rather than exemption from state acts 
that discriminate. 
Justice Miller’s subsequent opinion in Ex parte Yarbrough 
provided a better basis for reconciling the language of the Amendment 
with the power to forbid private racially motivated attacks on voters in 
state elections.  After holding that the federal government could protect 
the right to vote in federal elections because it was a federal privilege, he 
argued that the right to vote in a state election without being subject to 
discrimination was also a federal privilege.165  The source of the right to 
vote where the state excluded African-Americans would be the 
provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment.166  Thus, the person exercising 
that vote would be exercising a federal constitutional right, and the 
federal government can protect the exercise of federal rights: 
In all cases where the former slave-holding States had not removed 
from their Constitutions the words “white man” as a qualification for 
voting, this provision [the Fifteenth Amendment] did, in effect, confer 
on him the right to vote, because, being paramount to the State law, 
and a part of the State law, it annulled the discriminating word white, 
and thus left him in the enjoyment of the same right as white persons.  
And such would be the effect of any future constitutional provision of 
a State which should give the right of voting exclusively to white 
people, whether they be men or women.  In such cases this fifteenth 
article of amendment does, proprio vigore, substantially confer on the 
negro the right to vote, and Congress has the power to protect and 
enforce that right.167 
This analysis focused on the constitutional obligation of the state to 
provide the opportunity to vote without racial discrimination.168  Federal 
law may prohibit interference with the state’s performance of that 
obligation.169  Even if state law is racially neutral, private violence by 
groups like the Ku Klux Klan could exclude a race from the opportunity 
to vote provided by the state.170  The result would be ballots handed out 
by the state to one race only.  The citizen has a right to obtain the vote 
 
Id. (citing Reese, 92 U.S. 214).  The Court found the count on interference with the franchise “not 
good and sufficient in law” because it failed to allege that any obstruction was on account of color – 
but it did not indicate that state action need be alleged.  See id. at 555-57. 
 165. See Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 663-65 (1884). 
 166. Id. at 664-65. 
 167. Id. at 665 (citing Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880)). 
 168. See id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See id. at 661-62. 
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from the state without racial discrimination, and private acts on a racial 
basis could exclude the voter from a benefit that the state was 
constitutionally bound to provide.  Thus, Congress should have power to 
prohibit interference with the right of the citizen to vote without being 
subjected to racial discrimination. 
This analysis empowers Congress to assist states in fulfilling their 
constitutional duties; it does not preempt them.  Where the constitutional 
duty of the state is negative – for example, “do not interfere with 
someone’s natural rights” – private interference with those rights does 
not interfere with the state’s constitutional obligation.  Where the state 
has an obligation to provide individuals with something, private acts 
may interfere with the state’s performance of its obligation.  However, 
even if the duty is the positive one of protecting another individual from 
harm, infliction of the harm does not interfere with the state performing 
its duty.  Thus, the analysis does not threaten federalism because it does 
not authorize the federal government to enact criminal and civil laws of 
contract, property, and criminal law. 
Given the purpose analysis of Slaughter-House, the dicta in the 
cases following it correctly found congressional power to ban election 
interference based on race.  Reese, Cruikshank, and Yarbrough discussed 
the right to vote in state elections entirely in terms of the Fifteenth 
Amendment, because the Court had not yet found that the Equal 
Protection Clause applied to voting.171  Although the state determines 
what state offices are elective as well as defining eligibility to vote for 
them, equal protection developments that describe voting as a 
fundamental interest suggest it may be time to reexamine the scope of 
privileges and immunities of United States citizens in state elections. 
Today, the Court has recognized a much broader scope for federal 
privileges in state elections, noting that equal protection “restrains the 
States from fixing voter qualifications which invidiously 
discriminate.”172  The Constitution now protects against discrimination 
based on  gender,173 age,174 or property,175 and the Court has found the 
 
 171. See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1875); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 
U.S. 542, 555-66 (1875); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 663-65 (1884). 
 172. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966). 
 173. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
 174. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. 
 175. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV; see Harper, 383 U.S. at 666-67 (holding poll tax 
unconstitutional). 
27
Bogen: Rebuilding the Slaughter-House
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009
BOGEN_COPYFORPRINTER.DOC 6/30/2009  3:47 PM 
1156 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:1129 
Equal Protection Clause secures equality in representation,176 in the way 
votes are counted177 and, combined with the right to travel, protects new 
residents as well.178  In making these decisions, the Court has said that 
“the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic 
society.”179  Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment protects voting against 
any invidious discrimination by the state – such a right is a privilege of 
citizens of the United States because it is derived from the Constitution. 
Under the reasoning used in Slaughter-House, Cruikshank, Reese, and 
Yarbrough, Congress should have power under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit private interference with voting in 
state elections based on invidious discrimination. 
James v. Bowman180 stands as an obstacle to this analysis.  It was 
decided at the turn of the century and, to some degree, put a nail in the 
coffin of Reconstruction.  In James, the Court stated that a statute that 
purports to punish individual action could not be sustained under the 
Fifteenth Amendment.181  Thus, Congress could not punish “anyone 
who, by means of bribery, prevents another to whom the right of 
suffrage is guaranteed by [the Fifteenth Amendment] from exercising 
that right.”182  In reaching its decision, the Court relied on Fourteenth 
Amendment cases that held state action is necessary – the Civil Rights 
Cases and Harris.183  Because the indictment in James did not charge 
that the act was done with a racial intent, the holding is slightly 
ambiguous;  however, the Court’s language on the need for state action 
was clear.184 
 
 176. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (“We hold that, as a basic constitutional 
standard, the Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state 
legislature must be apportioned on a population basis.”). 
 177. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105-06 (2000) (per curiam) (requiring specific standards 
in recounts to ensure “nonarbitrary treatment of voters”). 
 178. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338-46 (1972) (invalidating state durational residence 
laws as a means of qualifying voters). 
 179. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561-62. 
 180. 190 U.S. 127 (1903). 
 181. Id. at 139. 
 182. Id. at 136. 
 183. See infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text. 
 184. See James, 190 U.S. at 139.  The Court stated: 
No discrimination on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude is 
charged.  These authorities show that a statute which purports to punish purely 
individual action cannot be sustained as an appropriate exercise of the power conferred 
by the 15th Amendment upon Congress to prevent action by the state through some one 
or more of its official representatives, and that an indictment which charges no 
discrimination on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude is likewise 
destitute of support by such amendment. 
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A majority of the Supreme Court rejected this analysis in a 
fractured opinion in United States v. Guest.185  Three justices in the 
plurality agreed with the three dissenting justices that Congress could 
reach private action under its power to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.186  Justice Brennan wrote a 
dissent in which Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas joined that 
argued Congress could require the state to provide facilities on a 
nondiscriminatory basis and could then protect access to such facilities: 
Viewed in its proper perspective, § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
appears as a positive grant of legislative power, authorizing Congress 
to exercise its discretion in fashioning remedies to achieve civil and 
political equality for all citizens.  No one would deny that Congress 
could enact legislation directing state officials to provide Negroes with 
equal access to state schools, parks and other facilities owned or 
operated by the State.  Nor could it be denied that Congress has the 
power to punish state officers who, in excess of their authority and in 
violation of state law, conspire to threaten, harass and murder Negroes 
for attempting to use these facilities.  And I can find no principle of 
federalism nor word of the Constitution that denies Congress power to 
determine that in order adequately to protect the right to equal 
utilization of state facilities, it is also appropriate to punish other 
individuals—not state officers themselves and not acting in concert 
with state officers—who engage in the same brutal conduct for the 
same misguided purpose.187 
In other words, where the Constitution requires a state to furnish 
something on a nondiscriminatory basis, Congress has power to 
vindicate that right by punishing anyone who interferes with access to 
that good or service.  Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, like 
Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, empowers Congress to protect 
the states from acts that would interfere with fulfilling their 
constitutional obligation.188  This is the reasoning of Yarbrough.189 
Justice Clark, joined by Justices Black and Fortas, wrote a 
concurring opinion that stated “there now can be no doubt that the 
 
Id. 
 185. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-60 (1966) (upholding indictment under federal 
statute for conspiracy to obstruct privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States by private 
attempts to prevent interstate travel). 
 186. Id. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring); Id. at 777-84 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 187. Id. at 784 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted). 
 188. See id. at 777; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1884). 
 189. See Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 662-63. 
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specific language of § 5 empowers the Congress to enact laws punishing 
all conspiracies – with or without state action – that interfere with 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.”190  Although the Justice did not fully 
explain how private action can interfere with a Fourteenth Amendment 
right, he believed that preventing access to state facilities on a racial 
basis would be such an interference.191 
The Supreme Court in United States v. Morrison dismissed this 
portion of the Guest decision as dicta.192  However, the Court overlooked 
the distinction between affirmative and negative rights.  Morrison 
stressed that state action was required by United States v. Harris193 and 
the Civil Rights Cases,194 the cases that James v. Bowman195 relied 
upon.196  But neither case involved interference with a constitutional 
right.  Although a state may not discriminate in providing any form of 
public accommodation, there is no interference with that obligation 
when a private company discriminates.  Thus, the Civil Rights Cases 
concerned negative rights to be free of state behavior rather than a right 
to get something.197  Harris involved a lynching where the mob took a 
person from state officials.198  The state cannot take a life without due 
process, but that constitutional right is a shield against the behavior of 
the state.199  The state’s obligation to provide due process is conditioned 
upon the state being the source of the deprivation.  Thus, a private actor 
or group who murders does not interfere with the state’s constitutional 
obligation, because the state did not do the killing.  Under the theory of 
the law in Harris, virtually any criminal act would be a federal crime, 
and the Court said that Congress lacked the power to reach simple 
breaches of the law.200 
The petitioner’s theory in Morrison was that Congress could act 
when it considered states acted in a discriminatory fashion in providing 
 
 190. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 762 (1966) (Clark, J., concurring). 
 191. See id. 
 192. 529 U.S. 598, 622-24 (2000). 
 193. 106 U.S. 629 (1883). 
 194. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 195. 190 U.S. 127 (1903). 
 196. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 622-24 (citing Harris, 106 U.S. at 639; Civil Rights Cases, 109 
U.S. at 18; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 544 (1875); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 
318 (1879)). 
 197. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11 (“Positive rights and privileges are undoubtedly 
secured by the Fourteenth Amendment; but they are secured by way of prohibition against State 
laws and State proceedings affecting those rights and privileges . . . .”). 
 198. 106 U.S. 629, 629-632 (1883). 
 199. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. 
 200. See Harris, 106 U.S. at 643. 
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remedies, and the Court at the very least required a greater showing of 
necessity on that issue.201  But none of these cases involved an attempt to 
protect the state and to enable it to provide mandated goods and services.  
Since Morrison did not refer to issues of access to state goods or 
services, Rehnquist’s opinion is itself dicta.  Congress should have 
power to protect the state in fulfilling its constitutional obligations – that 
is a method of enforcing the obligation itself. 
For example, segregation by school officials violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and Congress may prohibit it under its Section 5 powers.202  
But Congress should be able to protect state officials from rioters who 
attempt to compel them to segregate.203  The federal government must 
have power to protect them as it does any other person carrying out a 
federal obligation.  Violence generally does not interfere with the ability 
of the state to protect its citizens equally, because the state satisfies its 
obligation by punishing the offender through its civil and criminal laws;  
however, where private persons interfere with access to the state so that 
the state provides its benefits to only one group (the ones who were able 
to show up), the private action creates discrimination.  In that context, 
the federal government should be able to protect the state from private 
interference with its federal obligation. 
VI.  THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE 
The Court might be reluctant to expand federal power under the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in light of the precedent of James 
and Morrison.  However, just as the Court used equal protection to 
circumvent prior Guarantee Clause precedents in Baker v. Carr,204 it 
could use the Guarantee Clause to avoid the state action limits of its 
equal protection precedents. 
 
 201. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 624-27 (2000).  The Court noted that the remedy 
was not congruent and proportional to any alleged violation of the amendment; it was not directed at 
the state, and applied even in states that had no history of discrimination.  Id.  See Pamela 
Brandwein, A Judicial Abandonment of Blacks? Rethinking the “State Action” Cases of the Waite 
Court, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 343, 355-59 (2007) (arguing that the Waite Court era “preserved 
federal power to reach private individuals as a remedy” when there was “state neglect” to protect 
race-based wrongs). 
 202. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-96 (1954); City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 487-88 (1989). 
 203. See Brewer v. Hoxie Sch. Dist. No. 46, 238 F.2d 91, 100 (8th Cir. 1956) (“[T]he existence 
of a Constitutional duty . . . presupposes a correlative right in the person upon whom the duty is 
imposed to be free from direct interference with its performance.”). 
 204. 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962). 
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The Guarantee Clause recognizes the importance of governance by 
the people of a state as a privilege of citizens of the United States.  
Article IV, Section 4 provides that the “United States shall guarantee to 
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall 
protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the 
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be 
convened) against domestic Violence.”205 
The Court has treated the Guarantee Clause as raising a political 
question inappropriate for judicial review.206  However, the Necessary 
and Proper Clause grants Congress the power “[t]o make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other 
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States . . . .”207  Thus, Congress has power to enact a law necessary to 
guarantee every state a republican form of government.  Some 
Republicans used the Guarantee Clause to justify Reconstruction 
measures after the Civil War.208  In Texas v. White, Chief Justice Waite 
said that “the power to carry into effect the clause of guaranty is 
primarily a legislative power, and resides in Congress.”209  In general, 
however, there has been very little litigation over congressional power 
under this Clause. 
The Court has indicated that the Guarantee Clause may be satisfied 
by a variety of structures.210  If the core meaning of republican 
government is control by the people over their rulers, the guarantee may 
protect the choices that the state makes from federal interference.211  
Professor Merritt has argued powerfully that the Clause “prohibits the 
states from adopting nonrepublican forms of government [and] forbids 
 
 205. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 206. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962) (“We hold that the claim pleaded here neither 
rests upon nor implicates the Guaranty Clause and that its justiciability is therefore not foreclosed 
by our decisions of cases involving that clause.”); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849) 
(“[T]he Constitution of the United States, as far as it has provided for an emergency of this kind, 
and authorized the general government to interfere in the domestic concerns of a State, has treated 
the subject as political in its nature, and placed the power in the hands of that department.”). 
 207. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 208. See MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, Preserving the Constitution: The Conservative Basis of 
Radical Reconstruction, in MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, PRESERVING THE CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS ON 
POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE RECONSTRUCTION ERA 3, 11-12, 17 (2006); WILLIAM M. 
WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 166-243 (1972). 
 209. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 730 (1868). 
 210. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 175 (1874) (“No particular government is 
designated as republican, neither is the exact form to be guaranteed, in any manner especially 
designated.”). 
 211. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a 
Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1988). 
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the federal government from interfering with state governments in a way 
that would destroy their republican character.”212 
But the guarantee of a republican form of government should also 
empower the federal government to assist the existing state government 
in maintaining its republican character.  Rather than interfere with state 
choices, the federal government could protect those choices.  Thus, the 
federal government should have the power to assure that persons are 
able to vote when they are properly constituted as voters by the state or 
by the constitutional prohibition against invidious discrimination.  Any 
attempt by persons to prevent others from voting for reasons that would 
be invidious discrimination should be within the power of Congress to 
regulate.  These individuals are preventing access to something that the 
Constitution requires the state afford without such discrimination.  As a 
majority of justices suggested in Guest, this should be a basis for the 
exercise of congressional enforcement power under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.213 
A.  Voting 
According to the reasoning in the Slaughter-House Cases and its 
progeny, the federal government can protect individuals from 
interference with their exercise of federal rights.  If a republican form of 
government is guaranteed to the states by the Constitution, the federal 
government should have power to protect the states from threats to their 
form of government.  Several Supreme Court cases have denied federal 
power to protect voting in state elections, either on the ground that 
voting in state elections is not a federal right, or that the constitutional 
limits apply only to state and not individual actions.214  However, none 
of these cases squarely addressed the federal power to act under the 
Guarantee Clause.215 
 
 212. Id. at 25. 
 213. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 761-62 (1966) (Clark, J., concurring, joined by 
Black and Fortas, JJ.); id. at 777 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by 
Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J.). 
 214. James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 142 (1903) (holding federal statute prohibiting bribery 
in elections pursuant to Fifteenth Amendment unconstitutional because no state action required); 
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555-57 (1875) (holding the indictment invalid because it 
did not allege a racial motivation for the interference with the vote); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 
214, 217-18 (1875) (holding that the only federal privilege with respect to voting in state elections 
was to be free of racial discrimination). 
 215. In Reese, the Court construed a voting rights statute to apply to non-racially motivated 
obstructions to state voting.  92 U.S. at 220.  It then held that the statute was not justified by the 
Fifteenth Amendment, which was confined to prohibition of racial discrimination.  See id. at 220-
33
Bogen: Rebuilding the Slaughter-House
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009
BOGEN_COPYFORPRINTER.DOC 6/30/2009  3:47 PM 
1162 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:1129 
The Court did mention the Guarantee Clause in United States v. 
Cruikshank, but it did not directly confront the argument that the Clause 
supported voting rights legislation.  In Cruikshank, the Court dismissed 
an indictment that charged defendants with injuring parties because they 
had voted in a state election.216  The Court said that the “right of suffrage 
is not a necessary attribute of national citizenship,” citing Reese.217  
However, the indictment was based on the Enforcement Act of 1870, 
which made it a crime to conspire to injure a person “with intent to 
prevent or hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or 
privilege granted or secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States . . . .”218  In order to find a violation of the Enforcement 
Act, the Court would have to hold that voting in states was a right or 
privilege secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.  It did 
not do so.219  The Court could not rely on the Guarantee Clause to 
establish the right because its precedents held that the Clause was non-
justiciable.220  The Court indicated that the Guarantee Clause was 
relevant but did not apply in this case.221 
The state made no request for assistance.  Although Justice Bradley 
on circuit had held the voting intimidation provisions of the Enforcement 
Act unconstitutional because they did not require an intent to 
discriminate,222 Justice Waite’s Supreme Court opinion did not discuss 
them.223  Since the Court did not discuss a statute specifically prohibiting 
interference with the vote, it did not examine whether the Guarantee 
Clause empowered Congress to enact such a statute.  Thus, Cruikshank 
 
22.  The government waived all other constitutional arguments, so the case failed to set any 
precedent with respect to congressional power under the Guarantee Clause, or even under equal 
protection.  See id. at 216.  Similarly, although it raised the state action barrier, James v. Bowman 
did not examine the Guarantee Clause power. 
 216. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555-57 (1875). 
 217. Id. at 555 (citing Reese, 92 U.S. 214). 
 218. Id. at 544 (citing Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 6, 16 Stat. 141). 
 219. Id. at 556. 
 220. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962). 
 221. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 556 (“If a State cannot protect itself against domestic violence, the 
United States may, upon the call of the executive, when the legislature cannot be convened, lend 
their assistance for that purpose.  This is a guaranty of the Constitution (art. 4, sect. 4); but it applies 
to no case like this.”).  See Leslie Friedman Goldstein, The Second Amendment, the Slaughter-
House Cases (1873), and United States v. Cruikshank (1876), 1 ALB. GOV’T. L. REV. 365, 405-07 
(2008), for a discussion of the Cruikshank Court’s use of the Guarantee Clause. 
 222. See United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707, 715 (C.C.D. La. 1874). 
 223. He did make reference to Reese, decided at the same term, which held that the Fifteenth 
Amendment did not empower Congress to enact the statutes, but did not examine Guarantee Clause 
issues.  See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 555-56.  Thus, the opinion in Cruikshank may have assumed the 
unconstitutionality of the statutes and, thus, their inability to support the indictment. 
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also sets no precedent with respect to congressional Guarantee Clause 
power. 
B.  Other Aspects of a Republican Form of Government 
The Guarantee Clause should also extend to empower Congress to 
protect individuals in obtaining access to state government, as Guest 
suggested.224  Interaction of government with the people is an essential 
part of the republican form of government, and the federal government 
should be able to guarantee it. 
In addition, the federal government should be able to protect speech 
on local and state political affairs.  As the Court said in Cruikshank, 
“The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on 
the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to 
public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances.”225  If Congress 
has power to guarantee to the states a republican form of government, it 
must be able to protect the political speech of its citizens on local 
matters. 
The implied right to discuss governmental matters based on 
representative government is not unique to the United States.  Near the 
end of the twentieth century, the Australian High Court recognized that 
freedom of political speech was indispensible to a representative 
democratic government, and found that it was implied in the 
constitutional provisions for representative government.226  In the same 
way, United States courts should find that the guarantee of republican 
government implies freedom of speech in political matters.  Such 
freedom of speech would not be as broad as the guarantee in the First 
Amendment, but it is derived from the function of speech in the 
operations of government. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The Slaughter-House Cases have been used by opponents of civil 
rights because Justice Miller limited the impact of one clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Much of the negative effect of this aspect of 
Miller’s opinion has been overcome by using other clauses of the 
Amendment in ways that his opinion left open.  The opinion itself was 
 
 224. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 n.17 (1966). 
 225. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552. 
 226. Austl. Cap. Television Pty. Ltd & New South Wales v. Commonwealth (1992) 104 A.L.R. 
389, 393-95. 
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designed to protect Reconstruction legislatures in the hope that they 
could secure civil rights on a state level.  A number of aspects of the 
opinion do promote the protection of civil rights.  The historical analysis 
in the opinion has been used to support broader federal power to deal 
with racial discrimination, and its reference to the right to travel has 
been cited to support such a federal right.  Finally, the opinion’s support 
for federal protection of political speech has been overlooked, but the 
analysis of privileges of federal citizenship – in conjunction with the 
often neglected Guarantee Clause – warrants federal protection of 
individual access to state government in voting, facilities, and political 
discussion. 
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